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This paper explores how earnings variability is related to retirement wealth. Past research 
has demonstrated that the average American household on the verge of retirement would 
need to save substantially more, in order to preserve consumption flows in old age. While 
several socioeconomic factors have been examined that might explain such problems, 
prior studies have not assessed the role of earnings variability over the lifetime as a 
potential explanation for poor retirement prospects. Thus two workers having identical 
levels of average lifetime earnings might have had very different patterns of earnings 
variability over their lifetimes. Such differences could translate into quite different 
retirement wealth outcomes. This paper evaluates the effect of earnings variability on 
retirement wealth using information supplied by respondents to the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS). This is a rich and nationally representative dataset on 
Americans on the verge of retirement, with responses linked to administrative records 
from the Social Security Administration. Our research illuminates the key links between 
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 Lifetime Earnings Variability and Retirement Wealth  
Olivia S. Mitchell, John W. R. Phillips, Andrew Au, and David McCarthy 
 
I. Introduction  
Recent work has demonstrated the essential value of investing in large and 
extensive household surveys containing detailed questions on housing, pensions, social 
security, and other financial wealth, in order to fully understand the determinants of 
retirement wellbeing. One of the best such sources of information is the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), which we use in this paper to assess the factors that appear to 
drive retirement wealth and retirement needs.  Previous research demonstrated that the 
median American household on the verge of retirement in 1993 held about 2/5 of its 
retirement wealth in the form of social security promises, about 1/5 from employer 
pension promises, and the remainder is held in housing and other financial assets. Prior 
studies also indicated that the typical older household had not prepared for retirement 
adequately, in that substantial additional retirement saving would be needed to smooth 
old-age consumption.  Some factors associated with greater retirement wealth including 
having committed to “automatic saving” mechanisms including company pensions and 
having to pay off a mortgage.  The present paper extends the literature by focusing on the 
nexus between household retirement wealth and the variability of workers’ lifetime 
earnings. In particular, we use the HRS linked with administrative earning records data 
supplied by the Social Security Administration to evaluate the links between lifetime 
earnings variability and retirement preparedness.  
Our research is relevant to policy analysis for several reasons. First, potential 
pension or social security reform proposals could have very different impacts on retiree 
wellbeing, depending on how specific reforms link workers’ earnings profiles to their 
retirement benefits. For this reason, it is useful to evaluate how earnings variability (EV) 
differs across people of various income levels and socioeconomic characteristics. Second, 
it is of interest to determine how earnings variability translates into pension and social 
security values in the real world. Third, we explore whether retirement wealth is more 
powerfully associated with earnings variability per se, holding constant other 




whether retirement wellbeing is particularly vulnerable to earnings fluctuations at 
particular points in the work-life cycle.   
In what follows, we first briefly review prior studies regarding retirement wealth 
profiles for older Americans and describe the nature and scope of retirement saving.  We 
then discuss alternative measures of lifetime earnings variability and describe what the 
data show.  Last, we demonstrate how these EV measures are related to retirement wealth 
measures, holding constant other socioeconomic, health status, and preference factors in a 
multivariate statistical analysis. 
 
II. Prior Studies 
In previous research, we have used the nationally representative Health and 
Retirement Study linked to administrative records on earnings to explore how patterns of 
retirement wellbeing are associated with differences in the length of worklife and pay 
levels.
1 The initial HRS cohort was first interviewed in 1992, when it was on the verge of 
retirement – age 51-61 (also, spouses of any age were also interviewed).  Moore and 
Mitchell (1998) and Mitchell and Moore (2000) modeled and measured important saving 
shortfalls for this cohort. For instance, we found that the median older household would 
need to save 16% more annual income each year, if it were to maintain consumption 
levels after retirement at age 62. The targeted saving shortfall declined by half, to 8% of 
annual income, if the retirement age target were boosted to age 65.  
Follow-on research by Mitchell, Moore and Phillips (MMP, 2000) evaluated 
several factors associated with retirement saving, and it demonstrated that several factors 
played a role. These included respondents’ and spouses’ educational attainment, lifetime 
earnings, marital and children status, and ethnicity. Overall, socioeconomic variables 
accounted for a substantial portion of the saving deficits for retirement. In addition, 
health and preference proxies also accounted for 20-25% of explained variance, and in 
particular, households having longer financial planning horizons were likely to be closer 
to saving targets.  Various other factors, including depression, memory problems, and 
earlier-than-predicted mortality, did not appear to be strongly associated with saving 
                                                 
1 See for exa mple, Levine et al., 2000a and b, 2002; Mitchell and Moore, 1998; Mitchell, Moore and 




shortfalls.  Finally, the analysis indicated that understanding married couples’ 
preparedness for retirement requires one to take into account both spouses’ economic, 
health, and preferences.  For married households, spousal effects accounted for about 
one-half of the explained variance in saving shortfall patterns. 
Subsequent analysis by Levine, Mitchell and Phillips (LMP, 2000a and b, 2002) 
examined how married women’s earnings contributed to HRS household wellbeing in 
retirement. We examined whether women were eligible for Social Security benefits on 
their own account, and among the eligible, how much higher women’s wages would have 
had to have been for them to collect benefits based on their own work records, rather than 
their spouses’.  That research showed that wives ineligible for benefits would have to 
work substantially more before becoming eligible, but among the eligible, just a modest 
increase in pay would enable them to receive higher benefits based on their own work 
records rather than as a spouse.  These findings are of interest since they indicate that 
more market work by women would yield only small gains in Social Security benefit 
receipt for married women under current program rules, though their higher earnings 
would eventually enhance household retirement benefits. 
One key issue left unexamined in prior research is whether the timing and 
variability of workers’ lifetime earnings patterns are powerfully related to retirement 
asset accumulation. In the present project, therefore, we explore how aspects of lifetime 
earnings variability influence retirement wealth levels.
2 The outcomes of special interest 
include total retirement assets as well as the primary components of retirement wealth, 
including Social Security, pension, and other wealth. 
 
III. Research Design and Methods:   
The HRS, along with its companion employer pension and Social Security 
earnings and benefits records, afford a unique opportunity to analyze the influence of 
lifetime earnings variability on retirement and wealth.  In addition to containing rich 
health and demographic information, the linked HRS datafile provides a comprehensive 
picture of workers’ lifetime earnings patterns.  These are obtained from Social Security 
Administration records of workers’ taxable earnings from 1950 to 1991, provided with 
                                                 




respondent consent. We use these lifetime earnings records to generate measures of 
lifetime earnings variability for sample respondents and spouses, and then link these to 
the MMP datafile to examine retirement wealth and saving shortfalls.  
The variables used in analysis include measures of workers’ earnings variability 
and lifetime retirement wealth. Here we describe the earnings variability measures we 
derive, since the retirement wealth measures we have developed are described in previous 
research (LMP2000a, 2002; see also Appendix I).  
The earnings level measures we create using linked administrative records for 
HRS respondents appear in Panel I of Table 1. These earnings records are available from 
1950 to 1991 for all respondents who consented to the research match, and for whom 
records could be found. As is described in Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (2000), a 
match was feasible for approximately 75% of the respondents.
 3   In our sample, lifetime 
average real annual earnings amounted to about $15,000 as of 1992, and Average 
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) computed using Social Security formulas totaled 
$1,300 per month (all dollar figures are given in 1992 terms).   
￿ Table 1 here 
Under the agreement with the HRS project, Social Security Administration 
provided annual earnings records for this cohort of respondents. For 1950 to 1991, 
earnings up to the Social Security tax ceiling are available. From 1981 to 1991, what is 
known as “W-2” earnings are reported, which includes amounts earned above the tax 
ceiling. In this paper, we use the higher of the two values for years we have both reports. 
Figure 1 indicates how often annual earnings attained the tax cap, with the average for 
women standing at 2% between ages 20 and 50, as well as for each decade of life (i.e. 20-
                                                 
3 Because of the confidential nature of the administrative data, researchers may access them only under 
restricted conditions; see www.umich.edu/~hrswww for details.  These files were obtained for a majority of 
HRS respondents, namely those providing permission to link their survey data with administrative records 
supplied by the Social Security Administration and also with pension plan descriptions provided by 
respondents’ employers.  In a few cases Social Security benefits could not be calculated so the respondent 
had to be omitted from the analysis.  One reason for missing Social Security benefits was that respondents 
gave permission for the University of Michigan to request their Social Security records, but no match was 
obtained because their records did not match SSA identification information.  Also some age-eligible 
respondents declined to sign the release form permitting their Social Security data to be matched with the 
HRS (a handful of the very wealthy, some Blacks, and some Hispanics did not provide consent).  Omission 
of nonmatch cases might bias results if those who had a matched file differ from those lacking a match; 





29, 30-39, and 40-49). More men tended to earn at the taxable cap, with the proportion at 
the cap attaining 27% in their twenties, 49% in their thirties, and 30% in their forties.  
Future research will explore alternative statistical techniques to handle censoring of this 
sort, though we note here that earnings are less likely to be capped during the latter 
portion of workers’ careers (see Appendix II for further discussion of the statistical issues 
raised here).  
￿Figure 1 here 
One approach to measuring lifetime earnings variability uses the coefficient of 
variation, or the standard deviation of a worker’s earnings divided by his average 
earnings. For this paper we use taxable or W-2 earnings and compute COEFVAR for the 
entire period between the worker’s 20
th and 50
th birthdays; this we call lifetime 
COEFVAR. In addition we also compute the coefficient of variation over each decade of 
the worker’s life, or when he was in his 20’s, 30’s, and 40’s, respectively (COEFVAR20, 
30 and 40).  These three decadal EV measures help explore whether earnings variability 
fluctuates over the lifetime or whether it changes in some systematic way.  
To use only COEFVAR, however, would imply that earnings variability matters 
symmetrically: that is, that an earnings drop or an increase of the same size would have 
the same effect on key outcomes of interest. We test whether the symmetry hypothesis is 
inappropriate by also devising an asymmetric EV measure which focuses only on 
earnings declines.  We call this the “expected hit” to earnings (EXPIT), which allows us 
to determine whether earnings drops have a more negative effect on retirement wellbeing 
than do fluctuations per se.  Lifetime EXPHIT captures the expected size of a real wage 
loss in the event that it occurs over the worker’s lifetime, computed by multiplying the 
probability that he or she experienced a real wage loss by the size of the loss.  In this 
sense it is a shortfall measure akin to those used in insurance and risk analysis. Decadal 
measures EXPHIT20, 30, and 40, are also derived, measuring, respectively, the 
conditional expected earnings drops when the worker was in his or her 20’s, 30’s, and 
40’s.   
  Panels II and III of Table 1 provide descriptive statistics on these EV measures.  
Focusing first on the symmetric EV metric, it is interesting that lifetime COEFVAR has 




for younger workers and one-third smaller during the decade of the 40’s.  Thus 
COEFVAR falls at older ages.  Turning to the asymmetric measure, the expected size of 
the earnings loss conditional on an earnings drop (EXPHIT) averaged about 16% of 
lifetime earnings overall. Here, in contrast to the other measure, the results do not vary 
much by decade of life. Thus the earnings loss conditional on an earnings drop (EXPHIT) 
exhibits no clear age pattern.   
  Panel IV of Table 1 offers a correlation matrix of the key EV measures used in the 
paper, and it indicates substantial correlation both by decade and over the lifetime. As a 
set, however, the EXPHIT measures are less correlated among themselves than are the 
symmetric COEFVAR measures. Panel V demonstrates that both the COEFVAR and the 
EXPHIT measure also differ by lifetime earnings levels, as proxied by the quintile of the 
employee’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME).
4  In the case of the symmetric 
measure, COEFVAR, it is clear that earnings volatility follows a pattern: people in lower 
lifetime earnings quintiles have the highest lifetime earnings variability. The pattern 
remains but is attenuated for the asymmetric measure. In the analysis of retirement 
wealth, below, we explore separately how both lifetime EV and age-specific EV 
influences outcomes.   
  Further information on EV patterns is provided in Table 2. Here we report 
multivariate regression estimates using least squares, relating the lifetime and decadal EV 
measures to a vector of socioeconomic factors.  Controls include a measure of the 
worker’s lifetime earnings (AIME), the respondent’s sex, education, race/ethnic status, 
and marital status. In addition a health variable is included to assess whether the 
respondent had problems with activities of daily living; this is clearly a noisy measure of 
lifetime health problems, but it still can provide insight into functional limitations.  
￿ Table 2 here 
  Table 2 results confirm our earlier observation that workers with higher lifetime 
earnings levels are also those with lower earnings variability. However this is now a 
stronger finding, since the conclusion is statistically significant after holding other factors 
constant.  The inverse relationship holds for both lifetime EV measures, as well as the 
decadal EV measures. It is interesting, however, that the negative relationship becomes 
                                                 




more pronounced with age in the case of the symmetric measure, COEFVAR, but not for 
the asymmetric measure, EXPHIT. Evidently, the two EV concepts behave differently 
over the worklife.   
  Table 2 also indicates that several demographic factors are significantly 
associated with EV patterns, even after controlling on lifetime earnings (via AIME). Both 
EV measures are higher for Blacks than Whites, though not systematically for Hispanics. 
Surprisingly, respondents with greater educational attainment are more likely to have 
higher measures of COEFVAR, but for EXPHIT the relationship is weaker. Neither EV 
lifetime measure is strongly associated with the respondent’s sex, but by decade of age 
more differences by sex emerge. For example, women are more likely to experience 
higher earnings variability during their 20’s and less during their 40’s.  Being divorced is 
associated with lower earnings variability early in life, but it appears there is a positive 
relationship with EXPHIT and divorce later in life. The health limitation variable is 
positively associated with both EV measures during the decade of the 40’s, with no 
significant effects during the decade of the 20’s.  Finally, we note that the regression 
models indicate that the included right-hand-side variables account for about 40% of the 
variation in EV measures. In the next section, we control on these variables in models 
linking EV measures retirement wealth and shortfalls. 
 
IV.  Earnings Variability and Retirement Wealth  
Before turning to the multivariate analysis linking retirement wealth to the EV 
metrics, a few comments are in order about anticipated results. First, we hypothesize that 
earnings variability will behave differently, depending on the type of retirement wealth 
under consideration. As an example, Social Security rules use a redistributive average 
lifetime earnings formula, and thus provide higher replacement rates to lifetime low-
earners. By contrast, private pension formulas are less redistributive, because they are 
more likely to embody a final earnings-replacement philosophy. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to expect that pension wealth levels would be far more sensitive to earnings 
variability than Social Security wealth, particularly for nonmarried individuals.  The case 
for married couples is less clear since a nonworking spouse is entitled to Social Security 




household’s total Social Security wealth potentially more vulnerable to one earner’s pay 
fluctuations than a single person. Hence we have: 
Hypothesis 1:  Pension and financial wealth levels will be more sensitive to 
earnings variability than Social Security wealth. 
Second, we hypothesize that any given earnings fluctuation would have a larger 
effect on nonmarried workers’ wealth than on married household wealth levels. This is 
because lifetime pay fluctations would be expected to have a direct impact on retirement 
wealth for single individuals. By contrast, married households have opportunities for 
risk-sharing which could mitigate this link. For example, the wife might boost her labor 
market work when her husband experiences a negative earnings shock (this is the long-
discussed “added worker” effect in the labor economics literature). 
5  There is even the 
possibility that, through assortative mating, individuals would seek marital partners who 
have human capital risk characteristics orthogonal to their own, so as to more effectively 
manage risk within marriage. In any event, smaller sensitivity of retirement wealth to EV 
measures might be expected for married couples than for single individuals. Hence we 
have: 
Hypothesis 2: Retirement wealth for nonmarried workers will be more sensitive to 
EV measures than for married households. 
Third, we hypothesize that financial wealth may be the most sensitive form of 
wealth to pay variability, of all the types of wealth we examine. This is because, as 
mentioned above, Social Security and pensions tend to be formulaically related to 
earnings. By contrast, the process of building up financial wealth has more of a 
discretionary character, requiring the individual to save rather than spend liquid income. 
Recent studies on how hard workers find it to exhibit self-control when it comes to 
saving (Madrian and Shea, 2001) therefore would imply that automatic savings 
mechanisms are better able to build up retirement assets than less automatic means. We 
would also anticipate that changes in other wealth could be most easily offset by 
                                                 
5 A caveat to this anticipated difference by marital status, of course, is that people who report themselves as 
nonmarried on the verge of retirement may well have been married earlier in life, which would mitigate 
observed marital status differences in the EV coefficients.  The models also control for marital history (ever 
married and ever divorced) as well as for the number of children, for both married and currently 




changing financial assets, which again implies that this type of wealth would be treated as 
a buffer stock sort of holding. In both cases, we have: 
Hypothesis 3: Financial wealth will be more sensitive to pay fluctuations than 
other forms of wealth. 
In what follows, we evaluate the empirical data for evidence on these three hypotheses. 
 
Findings for EV Measures 
The goal is to evaluate whether lifetime earnings variability appears to be linked 
in important ways to retirement wealth, after controlling on socioeconomic, health, and 
preference factors including for respondents. That is, we use multivariate analysis to 
explore whether fluctuations in earnings over the life cycle is associated with greater or 
lesser levels of total retirement wealth, as well as pension, Social Security, and financial 
wealth. 
Summary statistics for the key wealth measures appear in Table 3.  We calculate 
that median total household wealth for an age-62 HRS respondent was approximately 
$400,000 (all dollar values are in $1992).
6  Since wealth has a highly skewed distribution, 
the mean is around $644,000.  Total retirement wealth according to our formulation is 
made up of four components: employer pensions, Social Security, net housing wealth, 
and other financial wealth (stocks, bonds, etc).  Median values of these components in 
our sample amounted to about $150,000 for Social Security wealth, around $70,000 in 
pension wealth, about $50,000 in housing equity, and $36,000 in financial wealth.   
￿ Table 3 here 
To evaluate how retirement wealth is associated with earnings variability among 
the older population, we next report results where we regress the key EV variables of 
interest on retirement wealth measures. These appear in Tables 4-7, which summarize, in 
turn, the EV coefficients from multivariate linear models linking (the natural log of) 
Social Security, pension, financial, and total wealth. In addition we hold constant a vector 
of control factors. We estimate separate equations for nonmarried and married 
households, first presenting the results for singles, and then for married couples. The 
vector of control variables is drawn from our previous work (MMP 2000), and includes 
                                                 
6 In keeping with past practice, we report the median 10% of the distribution.  
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lifetime earnings levels (AIME), education, race/ethnic status, health controls, and 
preference proxies. These have been explored in previous work and controlling on them 
permits the assessment of a “pure” effect of adding the EV measures to the analysis.
 7  
The equations for married respondents include the relevant characteristics of their 
spouses, including spousal EV measures. 
Table 4 summarizes results for the Social Security wealth regressions. Of all the 
wealth sources we examine, we posit that Social Security would be the least affected by 
variation in earnings since it uses a lifetime average earnings measure to calculate 
benefits.  It is interesting, therefore, that both lifetime EV measures are relatively large 
and negative in the Social Security wealth regressions, and the coefficients are 
statistically significant in the single person regressions. This indicates that workers’ 
earnings fluctuations actually have a detrimental impact on Social Security benefits, as 
anticipated by nonmarried workers.  This result could be due to the fact that pay 
variability can reflect respondents’ insured status for Social Security benefits: that is, 
people who spend portions of their worklives without a job (or in uncovered jobs) are less 
likely to be eligible for a benefit in their own right (Levine, Mitchell and Phillips, 2000).  
This explanation is supported by the fact that earnings variability early in life is not 
associated with single persons’ later Social Security wealth, whereas fluctuations in the 
decade of their 40’s has a very strong negative effect.  
￿ Table 4 here 
Turning to the married household results, it appears that a very different pattern 
prevails for Social Security wealth. Both EV lifetime measures are positive when 
statistically significant, and they tend to be small. Further, the decadal measures show the 
effect is strongest early in life.  As a consequence, these results indicate that after 
controlling on lifetime earnings, more EV is associated with higher Social Security 
wealth for couples, in contrast to the single person results. A possible explanation for this 
is that when earnings fall, benefits are relatively high due to the redistributive benefits 
formula; conversely, when earnings rise, household benefit increases are magnified since 
nonworking spouses can receive benefits that are a multiple of the worker’s retiree 
benefit.  This explanation seems plausible since the COEFVAR measure, which includes 
                                                 
7 Appendix Table 1 offers descriptive statistics on all variables used in the empirical analysis.    
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upside variability, is more often positive and significant than the asymmetric measure, 
EXPHIT. In general, the findings confirm hypothesis 2, that retirement wealth for 
nonmarried workers is more sensitive to EV measures than for married households 
Turning to the results for pension wealth, Table 5 confirms hypothesis 1, which 
was that pension wealth is more sensitive to EV measures than is Social Security wealth.  
Among nonmarried individuals, both lifetime EV measures are large in magnitude, 
negative, and statistically significant.  Most of the negative effect for the symmetric 
COEFVAR measure is concentrated later in life, during the decade of the 40’s,and 
EXPHIT also grows more negative with age. This may be because HRS respondents with 
pensions tend to have defined benefit coverage, where benefit levels depend closely on 
earnings close to retirement. As a result, the pension wealth values prove particularly 
sensitive to earnings fluctuations in later years. 
￿ Table 5 here 
Results for pension wealth in married households also tend to be negative for both 
spouses when significant, and the results for EXPHIT more statistically important at 
older ages. However, the couples’ results are also much smaller in magnitude as 
compared to nonmarried results, again supporting hypothesis 2 in that retirement wealth 
for married workers is less sensitive to earnings fluctuations than for nonmarried 
households. 
Findings for financial wealth appear in Table 6.  Results for unmarried 
respondents reveal a much less clear picture, with the lifetime COEFVAR measure 
positively associated with financial wealth, primarily attributable to a strong impact for 
the decade of the 30’s. By contrast, the EXPHIT coefficient is not significant, due to 
conflicting effects early and later in life. Taken together, the results from COEFVAR and 
EXPHIT paint a mixed picture for nonmarried persons, where financial wealth levels are 
higher for those with symmetric earnings variation in midlife, but lower for those with 
large earnings drops in midlife.  Among married couples, financial wealth is generally 
positively and strongly associated with earnings fluctuations, for both EV measures 
examined. The effect is particularly strong for younger workers in their 20’s.  It will also 
be recalled that financial wealth may be more sensitive to pay fluctuations than other 
forms of wealth (hypothesis 3); these results are only partly supportive of this view. This  
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is because the estimated coefficients in the financial wealth equations on COEFVAR and 
EXPHIT are often smaller in absolute value and less statistically significant, than they are 
in the pension wealth and Social Security wealth equations. Consequently it does not 
appear that financial wealth acts as a buffer asset, in times of earnings variability. 
￿ Table 6 here 
Table 7 summarizes how EV measures are associated with total retirement wealth, 
which is the sum of the components just examined plus housing equity. The findings for 
nonmarried persons reveal different effects of the symmetric versus the asymmetric EV 
measures, with COEFVAR coming in positive and EXPHIT coming in negative for the 
lifetime measure. The source of difference appears to be the differential effect of earnings 
fluctuations occurring in the middle decade of age, the 30’s, since greater symmetric 
variability seems to raise total wealth but negative hits lower it. For married households, 
the dominant pattern is similar, with COEFVAR raising total wealth, but asymmetric 
losses reducing it, particularly late in life. It is interesting that higher earnings 
fluctuations for spouses raise total wealth, which perhaps speaks to some substitution 
between couples’ work effort when pay levels fluctuate.    
￿ Table 7 here 
 
Findings for Other Factors 
Rather than reviewing all the results for other independent variables, we simply 
summarize here the other results reported in more detail in Appendix Table 2.  In general, 
the results are sensible and conform to those reported in our earlier work.  Not 
surprisingly, single as well as married workers with higher AIMEs also tend to have 
accumulated larger pension, Social Security, and financial assets, as well as total 
retirement wealth. Higher educational attainment is generally associated with higher 
retirement wealth levels.  Larger families tend to have less wealth than smaller ones, 
perhaps reflecting constraints on saving.  Hispanic sample members tend to have rather 
low wealth, but there is no significant relationship for Black respondents in equations that 
control for earnings variation. 
The health and preference controls also appear to be linked to retirement wealth in 
predictable ways. Those having difficulty with ADLs, who are pessimistic about  
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surviving to age 75, smokers, and those who have low cognitive scores, tend to have less 
wealth than their counterparts. Moderate drinking is associated with relatively higher 
wealth than not drinking at all.  The models also control for a number of “preference 
proxy” variables, including a measure of risk aversion that uses responses from a battery 
of questions on gambles to determine a respondent’s taste for risk.  Here we find that risk 
averse respondents tend to hold more wealth than do their risk taker counterparts.  We 
also find, consistent with prior work, that those stating they have relatively long planning 
horizons hold more retirement wealth than do respondents with shorter horizons.  Finally, 
we included a variable identifying which respondents contacted the Social Security 
Administration to learn about their benefit amounts.  Probably not surprisingly, those 
who did contact SSA had less wealth than those who did not, overall.    
 
V. Conclusions   
  This research has two goals: first, to see how earnings variability (EV) differs in 
the population according to income levels and socioeconomic characteristics; and second, 
to examine how pay variability over the lifetime is associated with retirement wealth. 
Using HRS data matched with administrative records on lifetime earnings provided by 
the Social Security Administration, we find some very interesting results. One finding is 
that workers with lower earnings variability also have higher lifetime earnings levels.  
This conclusion remains robust in a multivariate setting, after controlling on lifetime 
income levels and socio-demographic factors.  In addition, the inverse relationship 
becomes more pronounced with age in the case of the symmetric EV measure, 
COEFVAR, but not for the asymmetric measure, EXPHIT. Evidently, the two EV 
concepts behave differently over the worklife.   
The second phase of the analysis uses a multivariate model to relate our constructed 
EV measures to retirement wealth. Our results indicate several conclusions, holding other 
things constant: 
1.  Retirement wealth is more sensitive to EV measures for nonmarried individuals 
than for married households.   
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2.  Social Security wealth is inversely related to earnings variability for nonmarried 
persons and especially during the later workyears.  It is positively related to EV 
for married persons.  
3.  Pension wealth is particularly sensitive to earnings fluctuations in later years, and 
pension wealth is more sensitive to EV measures than is Social Security wealth. 
Results for married workers indicate less pension wealth response to earnings 
fluctuations, than for nonmarried households. 
4.  Financial wealth levels are higher for nonmarried workers having symmetric 
earnings variation in midlife, but they are lower for those with large earnings 
drops in midlife. Among married couples, financial wealth is generally positively 
and strongly associated with earnings fluctuations.   
5.  Financial wealth appears to be less susceptible to earnings variability than does 
pension and Social Security wealth. We conclude that financial wealth does not 
appear to act as a buffer asset in times of earnings variability. 
6.  Total retirement wealth is the sum of all components. Among nonmarried 
individuals, the symmetric and asymmetric lifetime EV measures had different 
effects: COEFVAR is positive and EXPHIT negative. This is mainly due to 
differential effects of earnings fluctuations during the 30’s. Among married 
households, the pattern is similar, with COEFVAR associated with higher total 
wealth, but EXPHIT reducing it, particularly late in life. In the case of couples, 
earnings fluctuations for spouses raise household total wealth, indicating a degree 
of substitution between couples’ work effort when earnings fluctuate.    
In sum, earnings variability over the worklife appears to have interesting and 
powerful effects on retirement wealth. The EV results for nonmarried persons are 
potentially the cleanest to interpret, since risk-sharing within married couples may offer 
means to offset the direct link between earnings fluctuations and retirement wealth.  We 
also conclude that symmetric and asymmetric measures of variability often give different 
answers, and we would propose that both are of interest for future research. In general, 
earnings fluctuations over the lifetime do appear to erode retirement wealth, though some 
forms of retirement wealth are more closely associated with earnings variability than  
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others, holding constant other demographic, social, and economic characteristics of 
workers and their families.  
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Appendix I: Data Construction 
Earnings Measures 
The data on earnings levels used to compute earnings variability measures are 
derived from the Social Security earnings histories provided under restricted access 
conditions. For the period 1950 to 1991, Social Security taxable earnings are available 
reflecting annual earnings up to the Social Security taxable earnings ceiling. In addition, 
for the period 1981 to 1991, additional information from the same source is available 
containing the so-called W-2 earnings. These are annual earnings reported on the W-2 
payroll forms provided by employers to the federal government. These two earnings 
figures may differ for the same worker if his earnings exceeded the taxable earnings 
ceiling in a given year. Inasmuch as the initial HRS cohort was in its 40’s during the 
1980s, having the W-2 data is quite valuable in avoiding the chances of censored 
earnings data. The earnings streams we use therefore rely on the higher of the W-2 versus 
the Social Security taxable earnings. While we recognize that some workers’ taxable 
earnings were capped prior to 1981, we do not formally model this phenomenon in this 
paper (in the analysis sample used in this paper, workers’ earnings were at the cap an 
average of once or twice by decade of age. Alternative methods of handling such 
censoring are taken up in Appendix II. 
 
Retirement Wealth and Shortfall Measures 
For the empirical analysis, we derived current retirement wealth for all age-
eligible respondents in the HRS datafile surveyed in 1992, along with real (in $1992) 
values of retirement wealth expected if the head retired at 62 and also at 65.
8  
This required us to compute expected present values of contingent future income 
(pensions, social security) combined with current and future values of financial assets and 
housing wealth.  Mean total household wealth, which includes net financial wealth, net 
housing equity, pension wealth, and Social Security wealth, stood at around half a million 
dollars, with the median household having approximately $325,000 in total retirement 
wealth. 
To project retirement wealth at age 62 and 65, we forecasted financial wealth by 
projecting four types of household assets, with future growth rates depending on their 
past trajectories: 1) net financial wealth which includes such assets as savings, 
investments, business assets, and non-residential real estate less outstanding debt not 
related to housing, 2) net housing wealth - the current market value of residential housing 
less outstanding mortgage debt, 3) pension wealth, or the present value of retirement 
benefits, and 4) present value of social security.  The forecasting methodology for 
financial wealth uses the techniques developed in MM (2000).  For instance, housing 
wealth is projected using HRS responses on the purchase price of each participant’s 
house, year of purchase, and mortgage payment amount and frequency.  Interest rates are 
drawn from the average interest rate for households in the American Housing Survey 
with the same year of purchase. Given these interest rates, we then determine 
amortization schedules for mortgages and project reduction in housing debt over time.  
This in turn implies an increase in net housing wealth.  Pension wealth is projected to 
retirement based on the plan provisions of employer provided Summary Plan 
                                                 
8 This discussion follows MMP (2000).  
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Descriptions and HRS data on salary and tenure of service where appropriate.  
Individuals are assumed to remain with their current employer until the retirement age 
and invest their pensions, if they have authority to do so, and returns assumed on defined 
contribution pensions are consistent with historical averages.  Mortality follows actuarial 
tables obtained from the Social Security Administration.  Social security wealth is 
derived from the earning and benefits file (EPBF) as described in MOS (2000). 
  To derive saving shortfalls, we then projected retirement wealth forward to age 62 
and 65 for each HRS household and computed how much additional saving beyond 
existing assets and pension plans would be needed to smooth that family’s consumption 
patterns as of that retirement date.
9  To determine adequacy of saving we use the 
replacement rate, an annual income amount sufficient to smooth consumption before and 
after retirement, allowing for changes in tax status and the change from saving to 
spending in retirement.  Each household’s replacement rate is solved for, in conjunction 
with the determination of its saving rate, so as to determine how much income it would 
need in retirement to attain pre-retirement consumption levels from retirement at that 
given age.
10  For example, if the determined rate was 0.80 for a household with an 
income of $50,000 per year pre-retirement, the suggested annual income level in 
retirement is $40,000 for that household given differences in taxes and saving.  More 
generally, assets needed at retirement are the result of taking into account i) household 
income at retirement, ii) the appropriate replacement rate for that income level, and iii) a 
joint and survivor annuity factor allowing for the age composition of the household 
(either individual or married couples). 
  The rate of saving necessary to meet these levels is solved for simultaneously 
with the household’s replacement rate. Given a replacement rate, the shortfall between a 
household’s projected value of assets and its projected need determines its prescribed 
saving rate.   This rate represents a prescription of what the older household would need 
to save as a percent of income each year until retirement to achieve that projected need.  
If the resultant projected saving rate was too small (large) to meet projected need, the 
replacement rate was lowered (raised) until replacement and saving rates balance. 
 
                                                 
9 Age 62.5 is the modal retirement age currently, where retirement is defined as the age at which people 
apply for Social Security benefits. 
10 This iterative approach to solving for the household’s saving shortfall is described in MM (2000).  
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Appendix II. Alternative Ways of Handling Capped Earnings from Administrative 
Records 
 
This appendix describes an approach to take in measuring wage variability while 
allowing for the censoring of our wage data.  Due to the extent of censoring for men at 
younger ages, but also because of the effect of exits from the labor force at older ages, 
this procedure has to date not provided reliable estimates of individual wage variance.  
For this reason, we do not report those results in the body of the paper.  We include a 
discussion of this method in the present appendix because it should be possible to use this 
approach with HRS data that will become available in the future.   
 
We assumed the following model for wages: 
 
*





, it Y  is true uncensored (real) wages, 
, it X  is a vector of individual demographic and other data,  
b  is a vector of coefficients, 
,,1, ititit v ne - =+ , 
2
, ~(0,)
i it N e es  is the wage shock, and 
i is an index for different individuals, while t denotes time. 
 
This wage error structure assumes that all wage shocks persist to the end of working life.  
Empirical estimates of wage shock processes that allow for the presence of both 
temporary and persistent wage shocks (see, for example, Campbell et al. (2000); Heaton 
and Lucas (2000), Carroll and Samwick (1997)), have demonstrated the significance of 
persistent wage shocks, often with a unit root.  In this appendix we present the analysis 
with only these persistent shocks, as persistent wage shocks will have a much greater 
effect on retirement wealth outcomes than temporary wage shocks, and because the 
omission of non-persistent wage shocks has no effect on the reliability of the results for 
reasons that will become clear.  The method can easily be adjusted to account for the 
presence of temporary wage shocks. 
   
For the demographic variables , it X , we used dummy variables for sex, race, educational 
attainment and year of birth.  We also allowed for a third-order polynomial profile of 
mean wages by age, including the variables age, age
2, and age
3.  In principle, interaction 




,, log() itit yY =
11, and ,, log() itit yY = , where the star denotes that the variable is the 
true uncensored variable, we observe the censored variable:  
                                                 




19   
 
,,, min(,) itititt yXc bn =+ , where  t c is the Social Security wage cap in year t. 
 
We wished to obtain an estimate for the wage shock variance
2
i e s  for each individual.   
 
A pseudo-likelihood function can be constructed for the entire sample. Ideally it would be 
maximized to estimate the values ofb  and 
2
i e s  jointly.  Implementing this approach 
proved computationally intractable, involving maximizing more than 6000 variables.   
 
A second tactic would take a two-step approach, first estimating the values of  b , and 
then estimating individual wage shock variances.  This allows the shock variance to be 
estimated separately for each individual, changing the estimation problem from one 
6000-parameter problem to 6000 one-parameter problems. This is similar to the approach 
adopted by Campbell et al. (2000).   
 
The values of  b  are fairly easy to estimate if we are prepared to make a convenient 
assumption about the variance-covariance matrix and if too many data points are not 
censored.  It is straightforward to assume that the errors are uncorrelated and 
homoschedastic, since this permits the use of censored regression programs in standard 
econometric packages.  Since censoring is quite severe for men at younger ages (see 
Figure 2), the censored regression yielded what appeared to be unreasonable values of 
mean censored wages.  This problem would have grown more severe with different 
assumptions about the error term variance-covariance matrix. 
 
For completeness, we describe our implementation of the rest of the procedure.  Owing to 
the unreliable estimates of mean wages, we cannot place much credence in individual 
wage variability estimates resulting from this procedure; hence we do not report the 
results here.  There were some also some other problems with the estimates that were the 
result of zero wages that will be described later. 
 
We used these estimated values of  b  to obtain conditional means, 
 
,,, ˆ [log()] ititit MEYX = , 
 
and used these conditional means to calculate estimated values of the censored errors , it n : 
 
,,,
ˆ ˆ log() ititit YM n =- . 
 
We knew whether each individual value of  , ˆit n  was censored or not.  We wanted to 
estimate the variance of innovations in the true, uncensored values of  , it n , (call these
*
, it n ).  
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,,,,1 ˆˆˆˆ itititit nenn - ”=- & . 
 
The fact that successive values are differenced implies that  , ˆit e  could be uncensored, 
censored above or below, or censored both above and below, depending on which of the 
two values of  , ˆit n  were censored above.  We used these four cases to construct a pseudo-
likelihood function for each individual, and maximized this likelihood to obtain an 
estimate of individual i's error variance 
2
i e s .  
 
The estimates obtained from this process proved unreliable, even on the assumption that 
the censored regression produced reasonable estimates of age-wage profiles.   This was 
because the variance estimates were very sensitive to labor force participation effects – 
especially to exits from the labor force at the end of the life cycle.  We found that our 
wage variability estimates were often little more than proxies for labor force entry and 
exit.  Without observing whether these changes in labor force participation were 
voluntary or not, it is difficult to account for them in estimates of wage variance of this 
type in a consistent and meaningful way.    
 
We anticipate that the proposed future linkage of new W-2 (i.e. uncensored) wage data 
with HRS records will attenuate the censoring effect and allow this technique to produce 
more reliable estimates. Also, additional regression information might allow us to impute 
whether changes in labor force participation are voluntary, which will help to mitigate the 
effects of labor force exits on our estimates.  
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Figure 1. Percent of Respondents with Zero Earnings by Age and Sex
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Table 1. Earnings Levels and Variability Measures for HRS Respondents
(Weighted data)
Mean Stdev      
I. Earnings Levels   
AIME $1,321 $970  
Average Earnings $15,324 $12,116  
II. Lifetime Earnings Variability Measures
COEFVAR 1.060 0.863    
EXPHIT 0.160 0.175    
III. Earnings Variability Measures by Decade of Life
COEFVAR20 1.030 0.768  
COEFVAR30 0.796 0.837  
COEFVAR40 0.642 0.713  
EXPHIT20 0.171 0.356  
EXPHIT30 0.131 0.248  
EXPHIT40 0.177 0.279  
IV. Correlation Between Variability Measures
COEFVAR COEFVAR20 COEFVAR30 COEFVAR40 EXPHIT EXPHIT20 EXPHIT30 EXPHIT40
COEFVAR 1.000
COEFVAR20 0.629 1.000
COEFVAR30 0.761 0.422 1.000
COEFVAR40 0.722 0.212 0.455 1.000
EXPHIT 0.727 0.372 0.525 0.697 1.000
EXPHIT20 0.591 0.214 0.546 0.525 0.675 1.000
EXPHIT30 0.444 0.239 0.273 0.558 0.702 0.243 1.000
EXPHIT40 0.497 0.332 0.307 0.426 0.743 0.233 0.333 1.000
 
V. Distribution of EV Measures by Lifetime Earnings Quintile







Average Earnings:Average annual real earnings over the lifetime (in 1992$)
AIME:  Average indexed monthly earnings over the lifetime in $92)
COEFVAR St. dev. of earnings/own lifetime avg earnings
COEFVAR# By decade of life: St. dev. of earnings/own lifetime avg earnings
EXPHIT (Prob. wage loss * size of loss}/Av lifetime earnings
EXPHIT# By decade of life: (Prob. wage loss * size of loss}/Av lifetime earnings
Source: Authors' calculations using the Health and Retirement Study. 
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Table 2. Factors Associated with Lifetime and Decadal Earnings Variability
(Weighted data)
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
RAIME1000 -0.603 ** 0.011 -0.347 ** 0.011 -0.593 ** 0.012 -0.511 ** 0.010
Rfemale 0.030 0.022 0.344 ** 0.022 0.175 ** 0.021 -0.195 ** 0.020
Rage 0.031 ** 0.003 0.024 ** 0.003 0.019 ** 0.003 0.030 ** 0.002
RBlack 0.110 ** 0.027 -0.016 0.028 0.127 ** 0.026 0.165 ** 0.025
RHispanic 0.033 0.038 -0.041 0.042 0.005 0.038 0.037   0.035
RLTHS 0.016 0.024 0.092 ** 0.024 -0.134 ** 0.023 -0.032   0.022
RBAplus 0.149 ** 0.019 0.167 ** 0.018 0.153 ** 0.018 0.087 ** 0.017
Revdivorce -0.147 ** 0.018 -0.083 ** 0.018 -0.070 ** 0.017 -0.026   0.016
Revwidow -0.096 ** 0.032 -0.036 0.033 -0.103 ** 0.032 -0.002   0.029
RADLany 0.022 0.036 -0.018 0.036 -0.077 ** 0.035 0.067 ** 0.033
_cons 0.020 0.149 -0.019 0.149 0.414 ** 0.146 -0.376 ** 0.136
Adj. R-square 0.461 0.365 0.504 0.364
Nobs 5939 5419 5310 5640
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
RAIME1000 -0.111 ** 0.003 -0.139 ** 0.006 -0.083 ** 0.004 -0.111 ** 0.005
Rfemale -0.006 0.005 0.057 ** 0.011 -0.012 0.008 -0.052 ** 0.009
Rage 0.002 ** 0.001 0.007 ** 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001
RBlack 0.038 ** 0.006 0.098 ** 0.014 -0.001 0.010 0.021 * 0.011
RHispanic -0.015 * 0.008 -0.061 ** 0.019 -0.011 0.014 0.029 * 0.016
RLTHS 0.019 ** 0.005 -0.049 ** 0.012 0.051 ** 0.009 0.052 ** 0.010
RBAplus -0.003 0.004 -0.011 0.009 -0.016 ** 0.007 0.013 * 0.008
Revdivorce -0.004 0.004 -0.053 ** 0.009 0.028 ** 0.007 0.016 ** 0.007
Revwidow -0.006 0.007 -0.041 ** 0.016 0.018 0.012 0.003 0.013
RADLany 0.040 ** 0.008 0.046 ** 0.018 0.050 ** 0.013 0.027 * 0.015
_cons 0.152 ** 0.033 -0.122 0.075 0.238 ** 0.055 0.363 ** 0.062
Adj. R-square 0.370 0.193 0.120 0.121
Nobs 5939 5907 5919 5924
Note: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5% 
Variable definitions:
COEFVAR Coefficient of variation age 20-50 RBlack Respondent Black (=1)
COEFVAR# Coefficient of variation for specific decade RHispanic Respondent Hispanic (=1)
EXPHIT Exp. Hit to earnings over lifetime, age 20-50 RLTHS Respondent has < High School
EXPHIT# Exp. Hit to earnings over lifetime for specific decade RBAplus Respondent has >= college 
RAIME1000 Respondent lifetime AIME/1000 ($) Revdivorce Respondent divorced
Rfemale Respondent female (=1) Revwidow Respondent widowed
Rage Respondent age in 1992 (yrs) RADLany
Source: Authors' calculations using the Health and Retirement Study.
COEFVAR COEFVAR20 COEFVAR30 COEFVAR40
Respondent has at least some 
ADL impairment
EXPHIT EXPHIT20 EXPHIT30 EXPHIT40 
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Table 3. Total Retirement Wealth and Components for HRS Respondents (1992$)
(Weighted data)
Median 10% Mean Stdev
Total Wealth $395,977 $644,368 $781,722  
Pension Wealth $70,459 $193,143 $285,164  
Social Security Wealth $150,249 $148,063 $55,081  
Financial Wealth $35,594 $222,588 $667,941  
Net Housing Wealth $50,393 $80,574 $94,299  
Note: Retirement wealth measures contingent on age-62 retirement and expressed in 1992 $.
Variable definitions:
Total Wealth Total real household wealth ($92) = Pension+Social Security+ Financial + Net Housing wealth.
Pension Wealth Total real household pension wealth ($92) from all pensions.
Social Security Wealth Total real household Social Security wealth ($92) 
Financial Wealth Total real household financial wealth ($92) 
Net Housing Wealth Total real household nonfinancial wealth ($92) 
Source: Authors' calculations using the Health and Retirement Study following Mitchell and Moore (2000). 
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1 Earnings Variance -0.063** -0.477***
  Lifetime (0.026) (0.143)
2 Earnings Variance -0.017 -0.057
  ages 20-29 (0.013) (0.062)
3 Earnings Variance 0.001 -0.161***
ages 30-39 (0.015) (0.057)
4 Earnings Variance -0.114*** -0.258**
ages 40-49 (0.025) (0.115)
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse
5 Earnings Variance 0.038*** 0.015** 0.110*** 0.014
Lifetime (0.006) (0.007) (0.028) (0.011)
6 Earnings Variance 0.018*** 0.013** 0.061*** 0.009
ages 20-29 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
7 Earnings Variance 0.016** 0.015** 0.023 -0.022
ages 30-39 (0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.020)
8 Earnings Variance 0.001 -0.025*** 0.024 -0.004
ages 40-49 (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.015)
Models 1 and 5 include only one measure of EV as indicated. Remaining models
include all three decadal EV measures in same equation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Authors' calculations using the Health and Retirement Study
Variable Name
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1 Earnings Variance -0.947*** -9.959***
Lifetime (0.266) (1.437)
2 Earnings Variance 0.072 -2.834***
ages 20-29 (0.281) (0.476)
3 Earnings Variance 0.283 -3.130***
ages 30-39 (0.318) (0.642)
4 Earnings Variance -1.614*** -3.497**
ages 40-49 (0.403) (1.377)
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse
5 Earnings Variance -0.345** -0.291* -5.854*** -1.411***
Lifetime (0.155) (0.150) (0.709) (0.384)
6 Earnings Variance -0.021 0.192 -1.231*** -0.239***
ages 20-29 (0.198) (0.180) (0.307) (0.089)
7 Earnings Variance 0.605*** 0.058 -2.209*** -1.528***
ages 30-39 (0.174) (0.184) (0.497) (0.438)
8 Earnings Variance -0.709*** -0.403* -2.332*** -1.992***
ages 40-49 (0.209) (0.221) (0.377) (0.374)
Models 1 and 5 include only one measure of EV as indicated. Remaining models
include all three decadal EV measures in same equation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Authors' calculations using the Health and Retirement Study
Variable Name






29   
 




1 Earnings Variance 0.732*** 0.377
Lifetime (0.171) (0.875)
2 Earnings Variance 0.091 0.807**
ages 20-29 (0.163) (0.314)
3 Earnings Variance 0.521*** -1.458**
ages 30-39 (0.166) (0.616)
4 Earnings Variance -0.096 0.481
ages 40-49 (0.253) (0.456)
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse
5 Earnings Variance 0.241*** 0.227*** 0.604** 0.401***
Lifetime (0.054) (0.053) (0.248) (0.094)
6 Earnings Variance 0.224*** 0.172** 0.251*** 0.125***
ages 20-29 (0.077) (0.069) (0.094) (0.031)
7 Earnings Variance 0.137* 0.041 0.055 -0.03
ages 30-39 (0.072) (0.075) (0.186) (0.165)
8 Earnings Variance 0.191** 0.329*** 0.073 0.146
ages 40-49 (0.095) (0.088) (0.153) (0.165)
Models 1 and 5 include only one measure of EV as indicated. Remaining models
include all three decadal EV measures in same equation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Authors' calculations using the Health and Retirement Study
Variable Name
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Earnings Variance 0.160*** -0.642*
1 Lifetime (0.054) (0.337)
Earnings Variance 0.015 0.109
2 ages 20-29 (0.037) (0.142)
Earnings Variance 0.196*** -0.514***
3 ages 30-39 (0.046) (0.142)
Earnings Variance -0.120** -0.371
4 ages 40-49 (0.056) (0.245)
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse
5 Earnings Variance 0.104*** 0.115*** -0.083 0.058**
Lifetime (0.018) (0.018) (0.086) (0.029)
6 Earnings Variance 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.029 0.030**
ages 20-29 (0.025) (0.023) (0.032) (0.014)
7 Earnings Variance 0.134*** 0.064*** -0.114* -0.084
ages 30-39 (0.024) (0.025) (0.058) (0.058)
8 Earnings Variance 0.031 0.066** -0.101** -0.093**
ages 40-49 (0.027) (0.029) (0.047) (0.046)
Models 1 and 5 include only one measure of EV as indicated. Remaining models
include all three decadal EV measures in same equation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Authors' calculations using the Health and Retirement Study
Note: Complete regression results appear in Appendix Table 2. 
Variable Name
Variable Name COEFVAR EXPHIT
 Married Households 
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Appendix Table 1
(Weighted data)
  Married Unmarried
Respondent Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev Nobs Mean Std. Dev
Respondent SES 
Rfemale 5010 0.484 0.500 1223 0.654 0.476
Rage 5010 55.421 3.202 1223 55.253 3.216
RBlack 5010 0.909 0.287 1223 0.790 0.408
RHispanic 5010 0.052 0.223 1223 0.065 0.246
Revdivorce 5010 0.255 0.436 1223 0.606 0.489
Revwidow 5010 0.035 0.183 1223 0.252 0.434
numchild 5010 3.381 1.960 1223 2.455 1.917
RLTHS 5010 0.187 0.390 1223 0.242 0.428
RBAplus 5010 0.404 0.491 1223 0.389 0.488
RADLany 5010 0.072 0.259 1223 0.074 0.263
r1cesd 5010 0.542 1.112 1223 0.936 1.561
r1smokev 5010 0.630 0.483 1223 0.675 0.469
r1drinkr 5010 0.888 0.845 1223 0.900 0.864
r1liv75 4824 65.527 28.280 1202 65.472 29.487
Respondent Earnings
AIME 4831 $1,345 $999 1202 $1,220 $829
avgannearn 5010 $15,693 $12,581 1223 $13,773 $9,778
COEFVAR 4923 1.078 0.890 1216 0.984 0.733
COEFVAR20 4496 1.021 0.772 1107 1.072 0.751
COEFVAR30 4381 0.788 0.841 1123 0.831 0.821
COEFVAR40 4650 0.655 0.730 1181 0.590 0.642
EXPHIT 4923 0.163 0.181 1216 0.148 0.144
EXPHIT20 4903 0.179 0.373 1204 0.137 0.268
EXPHIT30 4907 0.128 0.253 1212 0.143 0.226
EXPHIT40 4909 0.180 0.292 1215 0.164 0.216
Household Wealth and Shortfalls
ztwlth1 5010 $725,421 $829,859 1223 $303,376 $375,482
zpen1 5010 $215,926 $303,108 1223 $97,295 $159,899
zpen2 5010 $242,034 $326,826 1223 $109,770 $171,193
zss1 5010 $165,579 $44,523 1223 $74,372 $27,138
zfnw1 5010 $254,660 $725,818 1223 $87,661 $290,486
nhwlth1 5010 $89,256 $98,379 1223 $44,049 $62,752
save1_e 5010 -0.863 10.988 1223 -0.707 7.324
Spouse SES
Sage 4995 54.819 6.799
Sevdivorce 5010 0.244 0.429
Sevwidow 5010 0.058 0.234
SLTHS 5010 0.185 0.389
SBAplus 5010 0.413 0.492
SADLany 5010 0.092 0.289
s1cesd 4906 0.554 1.155
s1smokev 4906 0.626 0.484
s1drinkr 4906 0.881 0.844
s1liv75 4599 66.500 27.943
s1risk 4579 3.295 1.067
Spouse Earnings
s1ssaime 4227 1,258 974
spavgannearn 4349 14,665 11,120
spCOEFVAR 4273 1.051 0.890
spCOEFVAR20 3885 1.027 0.769
spCOEFVAR30 3784 0.757 0.821
spCOEFVAR40 3878 0.602 0.711
spEXPHIT 4271 0.182 0.320
spEXPHIT20 4186 0.252 0.873
spEXPHIT30 4246 0.128 0.255
spEXPHIT40 4127 0.164 0.313 
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Appendix Table 2a. Factors Associated with (ln) Total Retirement Wealth  
(Weighted data)
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse
Earnings Variance 0.104*** 0.115*** -- -- -0.083 0.058** -- --
Lifetime (0.018) (0.018) (0.086) (0.029)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.077*** 0.064*** -- -- 0.029 0.030**
ages 20-29 (0.025) (0.023) (0.032) (0.014)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.134*** 0.064*** -- -- -0.114* -0.084
ages 30-39 (0.024) (0.025) (0.058) (0.058)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.031 0.066** -- -- -0.101** -0.093**
ages 40-49 (0.027) (0.029) (0.047) (0.046)
AIME/1000 0.238*** 0.000*** 0.336*** 0.000*** 0.167*** 0.000*** 0.155*** 0.000***
(0.021) 0.000  (0.030) 0.000  (0.021) 0.000  (0.021) 0.000 
Less than High -0.128*** -0.158*** -0.052 -0.094*** -0.121*** -0.151*** -0.101*** -0.122***
School (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
College or more 0.165*** 0.182*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.182*** 0.197*** 0.187*** 0.199***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Ever Divorced -0.060* -0.022 -0.053 -0.022 -0.086** -0.051 -0.093*** -0.029
(0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Ever Widowed 0.008 0.023 -0.021 0.043 -0.009 -0.008 -0.043 -0.003
(0.069) (0.059) (0.073) (0.066) (0.071) (0.060) (0.068) (0.066)
Number of  -0.032*** -- -0.032*** -- -0.026*** -- -0.027*** --
Children (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Female -0.055* -- -0.090*** -- -0.058* -- -0.065** --
(0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.029)
Age -0.006 0.010*** -0.019*** 0.011*** -0.002 0.011*** -0.004 0.013***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Black 0.038 -- 0.022 -- 0.058 -- 0.079 --
(0.048) (0.056) (0.048) (0.050)
Hispanic -0.166*** -- -0.198** -- -0.146** -- -0.161*** --
(0.062) (0.091) (0.060) (0.060)
Any ADL -0.166*** -0.127*** -0.188*** -0.125** -0.153*** -0.120*** -0.155*** -0.116**
(0.043) (0.041) (0.056) (0.055) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) (0.045)
Subjective  0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001***
P(Live to 75) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cognition Score 0.013*** 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.013*** 0.007 0.012** 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ever Smoked -0.043* -0.088*** -0.029 -0.058** -0.052** -0.098*** -0.039 -0.088***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Alcohol  0.061** 0.120*** 0.055* 0.096*** 0.070*** 0.126*** 0.073*** 0.120***
(2 or less) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Alcohol  0.02 0.093* 0.023 0.043 0.017 0.093* 0.037 0.086
(3 or more) (0.048) (0.053) (0.055) (0.062) (0.050) (0.055) (0.053) (0.057)
Risk Averse 0.074*** 0.044** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.044** 0.064*** 0.046**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Long Planning 0.051** 0.060*** 0.039 0.043 0.053** 0.055** 0.046* 0.057**
Horizon (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Called SSA 0.039 0.01 0.058* -0.012 0.035 0.021 0.032 0.019




Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix Table 2b. Factors Associated with (ln) Total Retirement Wealth (continued)  
(Weighted data)
Earnings Variance 0.160*** -- -0.642* --
Lifetime (0.054) (0.337)
Earnings Variance -- 0.015 -- 0.109
ages 20-29 (0.037) (0.142)
Earnings Variance -- 0.196*** -- -0.514***
ages 30-39 (0.046) (0.142)
Earnings Variance -- -0.120** -- -0.371
ages 40-49 (0.056) (0.245)
AIME/1000 0.546*** 0.623*** 0.390*** 0.387***
(0.051) (0.058) (0.053) (0.052)
Less than High -0.217*** -0.139** -0.215*** -0.206***
School (0.064) (0.066) (0.063) (0.063)
College or more 0.374*** 0.334*** 0.417*** 0.411***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056)
Ever Divorced -0.061 -0.088* -0.071 -0.054
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Ever Widowed 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.177*** 0.176***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059)
Number of  -0.055*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.048***
Children (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Female 0.044 0.056 0.022 0.019
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Age -0.013* -0.013* -0.006 -0.004
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Black 0.106** 0.065 0.139** 0.124**
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Hispanic -0.170** -0.114 -0.171** -0.160*
(0.084) (0.083) (0.082) (0.084)
Any ADL -0.248*** -0.150* -0.224*** -0.198***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076)
Subjective  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
P(Live to 75) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cognition Score 0.017 0.013 0.019* 0.017
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Ever Smoked -0.239*** -0.193*** -0.217*** -0.205***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.050)
Alcohol  0.105** 0.067 0.116** 0.094*
(2 or less) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051)
Alcohol  0.106 -0.025 0.121 0.126
(3 or more) (0.126) (0.115) (0.132) (0.132)
Risk Averse -0.017 -0.083 -0.009 -0.033
(0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.050)
Long Planning 0.163*** 0.144*** 0.163*** 0.163***
Horizon (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Called SSA 0.096 0.062 0.083 0.082
(0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059)
Constant 11.889*** 11.892*** 11.850*** 11.789***
(0.437) (0.439) (0.443) (0.439)
R-Squared 1,156 979 1,156 1,139
Observations 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix Table 2c. Factors Associated with (Ln) Pension Wealth  
(Weighted data)
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse
Earnings Variance -0.345** -0.291* -- -- -5.854*** -1.411*** -- --
Lifetime (0.155) (0.150) (0.709) (0.384)
Earnings Variance -- -- -0.021 0.192 -- -- -1.231*** -0.239***
ages 20-29 (0.198) (0.180) (0.307) (0.089)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.605*** 0.058 -- -- -2.209*** -1.528***
ages 30-39 (0.174) (0.184) (0.497) (0.438)
Earnings Variance -- -- -0.709*** -0.403* -- -- -2.332*** -1.992***
ages 40-49 (0.209) (0.221) (0.377) (0.374)
AIME/1000 0.512*** 0.001*** 0.868*** 0.001*** 0.076 0.001*** 0.088 0.000***
(0.158) 0.000  (0.227) 0.000  (0.139) 0.000  (0.142) 0.000 
Less than High -0.818*** -0.962*** -0.415 -0.765** -0.674*** -0.909*** -0.518* -0.676**
School (0.256) (0.267) (0.305) (0.316) (0.257) (0.266) (0.266) (0.272)
College or more 0.039 0.528*** 0.124 0.253 -0.046 0.521*** 0.097 0.362*
(0.190) (0.189) (0.213) (0.209) (0.187) (0.185) (0.187) (0.185)
Ever Divorced -0.219 -0.442* -0.269 -0.37 -0.185 -0.496** -0.176 -0.342
(0.250) (0.255) (0.277) (0.269) (0.241) (0.248) (0.240) (0.246)
Ever Widowed -0.069 -0.827 -0.035 -0.564 0.066 -0.833 -0.221 -0.979*
(0.527) (0.524) (0.611) (0.577) (0.538) (0.517) (0.549) (0.552)
Number of  -0.02 -- -0.022 -- 0.009 -- 0.014 --
Children (0.063) (0.075) (0.061) (0.066)
Female -0.492** -- -0.217 -- -0.524** -- -0.26 --
(0.250) (0.269) (0.035) (0.242) (0.225)
Age -0.045 0.008 -0.021 -0.025 -0.046 0.004 -0.02 -0.034
(0.036) (0.018) (0.042) (0.035) (0.018) (0.036) (0.022)
Black -0.867*** -- -0.945** -- -0.599* -- -0.515 --
(0.318) (0.403) (0.324) (0.327)
Hispanic -1.267** -- -0.725 -- -1.343*** -- -1.445*** --
(0.497) (0.626) (0.490) (0.515)
Any ADL -0.758* -0.002 -0.455 0.08 -0.522 0.099 -0.746* 0.043
(0.400) (0.387) (0.479) (0.434) (0.399) (0.387) (0.411) (0.391)
Subjective  -0.002 0 0 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0
P(Live to 75) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cognition Score 0.076** 0.006 0.029 0.034 0.073** 0 0.059* 0.013
(0.034) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Ever Smoked 0.165 0.166 0.339 0.413* 0.266 0.162 0.245 0.327*
(0.185) (0.182) (0.227) (0.220) (0.181) (0.178) (0.184) (0.183)
Alcohol  0.101 0.151 0.065 0.031 0.032 0.154 0.121 0.074
(2 or less) (0.194) (0.189) (0.244) (0.229) (0.191) (0.188) (0.191) (0.188)
Alcohol  0.082 -0.571 -0.044 -1.070* 0.001 -0.519 0.005 -0.716
(3 or more) (0.391) (0.485) (0.446) (0.566) (0.390) (0.477) (0.410) (0.490)
Risk Averse 0.314* 0.346** 0.013 0.231 0.24 0.343** 0.263 0.222
(0.172) (0.173) (0.209) (0.210) (0.170) (0.170) (0.174) (0.173)
Long Planning -0.002 0.047 -0.149 0.088 -0.025 0.038 -0.035 -0.023
Horizon (0.176) (0.176) (0.210) (0.209) (0.172) (0.172) (0.177) (0.176)
Called SSA -0.018 0.03 -0.1 -0.08 -0.096 0.056 -0.275 0.169




Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix Table 2d. Factors Associated with (ln) Pension Wealth (continued)  
(Weighted data)
Earnings Variance -0.947*** -- -9.959*** --
Lifetime (0.266) (1.437)
Earnings Variance -- 0.072 -- -2.834***
ages 20-29 (0.281) (0.476)
Earnings Variance -- 0.283 -- -3.130***
ages 30-39 (0.318) (0.642)
Earnings Variance -- -1.614*** -- -3.497**
ages 40-49 (0.403) (1.377)
AIME/1000 1.647*** 1.727*** 1.149*** 1.204***
(0.309) (0.383) (0.288) (0.294)
Less than High -0.963** -0.688 -0.850** -0.911**
School (0.437) (0.485) (0.428) (0.438)
College or more 1.264*** 0.921** 1.152*** 1.139***
(0.414) (0.441) (0.402) (0.412)
Ever Divorced -0.385 -0.542 -0.217 -0.207
(0.366) (0.393) (0.357) (0.369)
Ever Widowed 0.034 0.254 0.105 0.085
(0.415) (0.454) (0.410) (0.418)
Number of  -0.04 -0.109 -0.025 -0.023
Children (0.092) (0.106) (0.089) (0.090)
Female 0.4 0.532 0.149 0.193
(0.443) (0.482) (0.421) (0.433)
Age -0.118** -0.118** -0.106** -0.111**
(0.053) (0.057) (0.052) (0.052)
Black -0.306 -0.474 -0.198 -0.198
(0.366) (0.410) (0.360) (0.371)
Hispanic -0.363 0.123 -0.64 -0.681
(0.633) (0.766) (0.631) (0.651)
Any ADL 0.224 0.361 0.504 0.501
(0.567) (0.634) (0.553) (0.558)
Subjective  0.002 0.001 0.001 0
P(Live to 75) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Cognition Score 0.117* 0.061 0.124* 0.116*
(0.068) (0.072) (0.065) (0.067)
Ever Smoked -1.454*** -1.253*** -1.242*** -1.226***
(0.343) (0.365) (0.334) (0.344)
Alcohol  0.414 0.487 0.39 0.365
(2 or less) (0.374) (0.404) (0.363) (0.370)
Alcohol  -1.033 -1.041 -0.915 -0.872
(3 or more) (0.859) (0.947) (0.878) (0.881)
Risk Averse 0.489 0.133 0.534 0.49
(0.343) (0.370) (0.334) (0.342)
Long Planning 0.896*** 0.819** 0.911*** 0.907***
Horizon (0.345) (0.365) (0.337) (0.342)
Called SSA 0.574 0.71 0.56 0.541
(0.429) (0.448) (0.428) (0.438)
Constant 11.354*** 11.887*** 11.625*** 11.821***
(3.1) (3.3) (3.0) (3.0)
R-Squared 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24
Observations 1,159 981 1,159 1,142
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix Table 2e. Factors Associated with (Ln) Social Security Wealth 
(Weighted data)
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse
Earnings Variance 0.038*** 0.015** -- -- 0.110*** 0.014 -- --
Lifetime (0.006) (0.007) (0.028) (0.011)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.018*** 0.013** -- -- 0.061*** 0.009
ages 20-29 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.016** 0.015** -- -- 0.023 -0.022
ages 30-39 (0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.020)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.001 -0.025*** -- -- 0.024 -0.004
ages 40-49 (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.015)
AIME/1000 0.240*** 0.000*** 0.224*** 0.000*** 0.229*** 0.000*** 0.225*** 0.000***
(0.009) 0.000  (0.009) 0.000  (0.010) 0.000  (0.010) 0.000 
Less than High 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.003 0 0.005 0.005 0.009
School (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
College or more 0.008 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 0.013* 0.001 0.011 0.005
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Ever Divorced 0.002 0.007 0.007 0 -0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Ever Widowed -0.027 0.005 -0.017 -0.006 -0.033 0 -0.01 -0.005
(0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.015)
Number of  0.001 -- 0.004** -- 0.001 -- 0.001 --
Children (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.009 -- 0.006 -- 0.009 -- -0.001 --
(0.012) (0.010) 0.009*** (0.012) (0.011)
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** -0.001 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Black 0.044*** -- 0.036** -- 0.044*** -- 0.044*** --
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Hispanic -0.027 -- -0.021 -- -0.023 -- -0.021 --
(0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020)
Any ADL -0.004 0.003 -0.01 0.002 -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
Subjective  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P(Live to 75) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cognition Score 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ever Smoked 0.002 0.002 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Alcohol  0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.01 -0.003 0.006 -0.001
(2 or less) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Alcohol  -0.008 -0.041** -0.004 -0.02 -0.007 -0.041** -0.012 -0.039**
(3 or more) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Risk Averse 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Long Planning 0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.003
Horizon (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Called SSA -0.021*** -0.006 -0.011 -0.008 -0.022*** -0.004 -0.021*** -0.006




Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix Table 2f. Factors Associated with (ln) Social Security Wealth (continued)  
(Weighted data)
Earnings Variance -0.063** -- -0.477*** --
Lifetime (0.026) (0.143)
Earnings Variance -- -0.017 -- -0.057
ages 20-29 (0.013) (0.062)
Earnings Variance -- 0.001 -- -0.161***
ages 30-39 (0.015) (0.057)
Earnings Variance -- -0.114*** -- -0.258**
ages 40-49 (0.025) (0.115)
AIME/1000 0.410*** 0.384*** 0.396*** 0.397***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Less than High -0.065*** -0.042** -0.059** -0.055**
School (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
College or more 0.062*** 0.028* 0.052*** 0.053***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Ever Divorced 0.011 0.012 0.021 0.031*
(0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Ever Widowed -0.006 0.01 -0.004 -0.003
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
Number of  -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
Children (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Female 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.185*** 0.181***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Age 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Black 0 0.031* 0.003 -0.005
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Hispanic -0.01 -0.01 -0.024 -0.006
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Any ADL -0.048 -0.041 -0.035 -0.038
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Subjective  0 0 0 0
P(Live to 75) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cognition Score -0.007 -0.008** -0.006* -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ever Smoked -0.082*** -0.039*** -0.072*** -0.071***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Alcohol  0.037* 0.022 0.035* 0.031*
(2 or less) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Alcohol  0.055* 0.04 0.060* 0.063*
(3 or more) (0.032) (0.025) (0.034) (0.037)
Risk Averse -0.011 -0.014 -0.009 -0.011
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Long Planning 0.035** 0.023* 0.035** 0.037**
Horizon (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
Called SSA -0.015 -0.005 -0.014 -0.015
(0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 10.059*** 10.032*** 10.077*** 10.056***
(0.158) (0.144) (0.154) (0.154)
R-Squared 0.66 0.73 0.67 0.67
Observations 1,159 981 1,159 1,142
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix Table 2g. Factors Associated with (Ln) Financial Wealth
(Weighted data)
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse
Earnings Variance 0.241*** 0.227*** -- -- 0.604** 0.401*** -- --
Lifetime (0.054) (0.053) (0.248) (0.094)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.224*** 0.172** -- 0.251*** 0.125***
ages 20-29 (0.077) (0.069) (0.094) (0.031)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.137* 0.041 -- 0.055 -0.03
ages 30-39 (0.072) (0.075) (0.186) (0.165)
Earnings Variance -- -- 0.191** 0.329*** -- 0.073 0.146
ages 40-49 (0.095) (0.088) (0.153) (0.165)
AIME/1000 0.452*** 0.001*** 0.603*** 0.001*** 0.375*** 0.000*** 0.346*** 0.000***
(0.054) 0.000  (0.088) 0.000  (0.049) 0.000  (0.050) 0.000 
Less than High -0.403*** -0.531*** -0.335** -0.337** -0.417*** -0.522*** -0.419*** -0.473***
School (0.115) (0.120) (0.140) (0.150) (0.116) (0.120) (0.120) (0.124)
College or more 0.311*** 0.305*** 0.323*** 0.215** 0.352*** 0.336*** 0.311*** 0.326***
(0.072) (0.070) (0.091) (0.086) (0.072) (0.070) (0.072) (0.070)
Ever Divorced -0.011 0.021 -0.067 0.154 -0.048 -0.02 -0.091 0.007
(0.103) (0.101) (0.122) (0.123) (0.103) (0.101) (0.110) (0.109)
Ever Widowed 0.306 0.2 0.01 0.197 0.274 0.148 0.194 0.129
(0.215) (0.160) (0.258) (0.193) (0.215) (0.160) (0.231) (0.180)
Number of  -0.142*** -- -0.171*** -- -0.137*** -- -0.147*** --
Children (0.027) (0.037) (0.027) (0.029)
Female -0.1 -- -0.256** -- -0.104 -- -0.242** --
(0.092) (0.118) (0.092) (0.095)
Age 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.006 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.033** 0.059***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009)
Black 0.491*** -- 0.688*** -- 0.489*** -- 0.485** --
(0.181) (0.227) (0.183) (0.192)
Hispanic -0.839*** -- -0.690* -- -0.786*** -- -0.819*** --
(0.284) (0.363) (0.283) (0.306)
Any ADL -0.640*** -0.471** -0.395* -0.252 -0.646*** -0.486*** -0.708*** -0.516***
(0.206) (0.185) (0.219) (0.214) (0.206) (0.184) (0.216) (0.197)
Subjective  0.002* 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.003** 0.002* 0.003**
P(Live to 75) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cognition Score 0.039*** 0.032** 0.025 0.018 0.040*** 0.033** 0.040*** 0.035***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Ever Smoked -0.130* -0.233*** -0.184** -0.191** -0.161** -0.249*** -0.136* -0.242***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.088) (0.084) (0.070) (0.068) (0.071) (0.070)
Alcohol  0.246*** 0.212*** 0.215** 0.231** 0.267*** 0.226*** 0.275*** 0.237***
(2 or less) (0.074) (0.074) (0.092) (0.093) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.076)
Alcohol  0.11 0.15 0.193 0.162 0.104 0.137 0.185 0.127
(3 or more) (0.157) (0.190) (0.176) (0.221) (0.159) (0.192) (0.161) (0.199)
Risk Averse 0.06 0.009 0.041 -0.051 0.058 0.009 0.057 0.038
(0.068) (0.068) (0.082) (0.080) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071)
Long Planning 0.225*** 0.288*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.230*** 0.281*** 0.225*** 0.285***
Horizon (0.066) (0.066) (0.082) (0.084) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068)
Called SSA 0.205*** 0.104 0.278*** 0.062 0.206*** 0.120* 0.222*** 0.091




Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix Table 2h. Factors Associated with (Ln) Financial Wealth 
(Weighted data)
Earnings Variance 0.732*** -- 0.377 --
Lifetime (0.171) (0.875)
Earnings Variance -- 0.091 -- 0.807**
ages 20-29 (0.163) (0.314)
Earnings Variance -- 0.521*** -- -1.458**
ages 30-39 (0.166) (0.616)
Earnings Variance -- -0.096 -- 0.481
ages 40-49 (0.253) (0.456)
AIME/1000 1.137*** 1.263*** 0.775*** 0.757***
(0.160) (0.203) (0.155) (0.153)
Less than High -1.143*** -0.996*** -1.156*** -1.129***
School (0.288) (0.319) (0.289) (0.290)
College or more 0.720*** 0.745*** 0.895*** 0.890***
(0.201) (0.210) (0.199) (0.202)
Ever Divorced 0.229 0.144 0.166 0.144
(0.226) (0.239) (0.227) (0.230)
Ever Widowed 1.122*** 1.068*** 1.164*** 1.125***
(0.255) (0.273) (0.257) (0.258)
Number of  -0.139** -0.103 -0.105* -0.121**
Children (0.058) (0.066) (0.058) (0.059)
Female -0.251 -0.232 -0.259 -0.257
(0.227) (0.238) (0.228) (0.229)
Age 0.035 0.044 0.054* 0.058*
(0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Black 1.219*** 1.208*** 1.297*** 1.329***
(0.256) (0.279) (0.262) (0.266)
Hispanic -0.987* -0.969 -0.974* -1.067*
(0.548) (0.606) (0.552) (0.555)
Any ADL -2.061*** -1.580*** -2.111*** -1.956***
(0.561) (0.549) (0.543) (0.524)
Subjective  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
P(Live to 75) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Cognition Score 0.088** 0.081* 0.095** 0.075*
(0.038) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039)
Ever Smoked -0.661*** -0.651*** -0.653*** -0.618***
(0.181) (0.187) (0.183) (0.187)
Alcohol  -0.026 -0.109 -0.006 -0.088
(2 or less) (0.201) (0.220) (0.202) (0.202)
Alcohol  0.234 -0.222 0.252 0.229
(3 or more) (0.504) (0.516) (0.513) (0.512)
Risk Averse -0.195 -0.273 -0.184 -0.252
(0.190) (0.204) (0.192) (0.193)
Long Planning 0.133 0.109 0.132 0.115
Horizon (0.184) (0.194) (0.187) (0.188)
Called SSA 0.457** 0.307 0.411** 0.423**
(0.205) (0.207) (0.207) (0.208)
Constant 3.958** 3.533* 3.768** 3.812**
(1.746) (1.882) (1.781) (1.777)
R-Squared 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.31
Observations 990 838 990 974
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Authors' calculations using the Health and Retirement Study
Variable Name
 Nonmarried Households
COEFVAR EXPHIT